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BOOK REVIEW
NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH
THE STATES. By John T. Noonan, Jr. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA:
University of California Press, 2002. Pp. 203. $12.95.
Reviewed by Matthew Fogelson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In his book, Narrowing the Nation's Power: The Supreme
Court Sides With the States,' Judge John T. Noonan, Jr.,2 argues
against the Supreme Court's recent trend of siding with states rather
than individuals. Judge Noonan outlines the Court's three new tools
used to restrict the lawmaking power of Congress as it pertains to the
states. First, the Court expanded the definition of sovereign immunity
not only to protect the states from suit, but also to protect all public
institutions, including universities. 3 Second, the Court held that there
must be "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted by Congress to prevent
the injury. '4 Finally, for legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court held that Congress must also demonstrate that it is correcting
a significant societal evil.5
State sovereignty is the notion that states, as sovereign entities,
should be immune from suits by their citizens. In the prologue, Judge
Noonan describes sovereignty as "an ancient concept" and immunity
as "a concept of the common law as old as the monarchy of England.
' 6
He sets forth his thesis that recent decisions by the Supreme Court
expand and distort historical notions of "sovereignty" and "immunity"
by applying sovereign immunity to the fifty states, thereby restricting
congressional power.7  In addition, individuals seeking monetary
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, 2004.
1. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT
SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002) [hereinafter NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER].
2. The author is a Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.
3. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 3.
4. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
5. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 3 (citing Flores, 521 U.S. at 526).
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. 3-4.
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damages cannot enforce laws applicable to the fifty states because
states are immune from lawsuits.
In the subsequent chapters, Judge Noonan describes the
creation of the Court's new definition of sovereign immunity and its
recent application to federal legislation.9 He looks at a number of case
studies, which highlight how the Court uses its new tests to build up
states' power as sovereigns at the expense of Congress' lawmaking
power. Noonan then explains how this transfer of power ultimately
reduces the rights of citizens to seek redress under federal statutes.
These case studies include attacks by the Court on the federal
government's ability to protect patents issued to individuals against
encroachment by state agencies.10 In addition, they expand state
immunity to prevent suits against state universities for alleged
violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)"
and the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). 12 Judge Noonan also
looks at the Court's rejection of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) 13 in United States v. Morrison.14  The Court's narrow
interpretation of the Constitution's Commerce Clause' 5 in Morrison
served to increase the power of the states at the expense of an
individual federal remedy for sexual assault.' 6
In his conclusion, Judge Noonan criticizes the direction taken
by the Supreme Court in increasing the sovereignty of the states.' 7 He
also makes an attempt to suggest ways that the nation can overcome
such decisions. However, even these suggestions have a negative
tone, tending to explain which options will not solve the problem. 18
His closing comments are largely limited to criticisms of the Court's
actions and reasoning.19 While Judge Noonan's criticisms are valid,
8. Id. at 4.
9. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 15-40, 86-137.
10. Id. at 86-97. (discussing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 669 (1999)).
11. Id. at 103-19 (discussing Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
631-634 (2003)).
12. Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2003).
13. 1d. at 120-37 (discussing Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b)
(2003)).
14. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
15. The Commerce Clause states: "[The Congress shall have Power ] ... [t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 120-37.
17. Id. at 138-56.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 140-56.
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the despair that echoes in his work is premature. The Supreme Court
can set out the "law of the land" regarding the balance of state and
federal power, however, a more liberal interpretation by lower federal
courts is possible.2 0 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, where Judge Noonan sits, has subtly suggested methods for
sidestepping some of the Supreme Court's limitation on federal control
of the states.
21
II. SUMMARY
Judge Noonan begins his analysis of the current Supreme
Court's notions of state sovereignty by tracing the pertinent historical
and legal developments that led to the landmark decision of City of
Boerne v. Flores.22  Using the free exercise of religion clause, the
constitutional right at stake in Flores, Judge Noonan traces the Court's
treatment of this right throughout American history.23 Prior to the
1930's, the Supreme Court rarely involved itself in freedom of religion
issues.24 In the 1940's, the Court held that the First Amendment25
right to religious freedom is enforceable against the states under the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The right to free exercise
of religion was limited by federal laws, but remained relatively
unencumbered by state regulation over the next fifty years.27
20. See infra pp. 20-25.
21. See infrapp. 15-17.
22. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
23. Id. at 15-40.
24. Id. at 18.
25. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 19. The First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment
reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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A. Power Shifts from Congress to the Supreme Court in the 1990's
Judge Noonan argues that in 1990, the Court began to reverse
its thinking and allowed for state regulation of religious practices.28
Many groups petitioned Congress to pass legislation preventing the
states from regulating this area.29 As a result, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993. RFRA limited
government infringement on religious practice to instances where the
government could establish it had a compelling interest.
31
In City of Boerne v. Flores,32 St. Peter the Apostle, a Catholic
church located in Boerne, Texas, began to develop plans to enlarge its
existing church.33 By 1991, the congregation had expanded since the
present church was finished in 1923 and the 250-seat church was not
large enough to accommodate the 780 families in the parish, even with
three masses each Sunday.34 During the same year, the Boerne City
Council implemented "an historic district" for the purpose of
preserving those buildings within the district. 35  A portion of the
present St. Peter church was located within this new historic district.
36
St. Peter's enlargement plans necessarily required the demolition of
most of the existing structure save for the church's twin bell towers. 37
When the Archbishop of San Antonio, P.F. Flores, applied for a
construction permit to proceed with the planned expansion, city
authorities denied the permit on the basis that the existing church was
at least partially inside the recently created historic district. In 1994,
the Boerne City Council held a public hearing regarding the building
plans and ultimately sustained the denial of the license.39 In 1995,
Archbishop Flores began to assist St. Peter by filing suit under the
RFRA. 4 0 The suit alleged that there was no compelling governmental
28. Id. at 23-25 (discussing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), in
which the Court held that Oregon could properly deny unemployment compensation to two
Native Americans fired from their jobs for use of peyote for religious purposes because
exercise of religion was not free from laws that had an incidental effect on religious practice).
29. Id. at 25-26.
30. Id. at 26 (citing Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2003)).
31. Id. (discussing § 2000bb).
32. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
33. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 31.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 32.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Flores, 521 U.S. at511.
39. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 33.
40. Id.
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interest that supported Boeme's imposition upon the parishioners by
refusing to allow the planned renovation of their church. 4 1 Boerne
responded by attacking the constitutionality of the RFRA.42
The case was argued before the United States Supreme Court
on February 19, 199743 and a majority of the Court held that RFRA
was unconstitutional. 44 The Court looked at whether the Congress had
exceeded its constitutional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment45 by passing the RFRA.46  The court determined that
Congress' power under § 5 is limited to enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment and it cannot be used to create new rights or alter existing
ones.47 Judge Noonan points out that the Court failed to draw a clear
line between the creation of a new right or alteration of an existing
right, and a remedial measure used to enforce an existing right.48 To
help interpret this vague distinction, the Court developed two
important tests. 49 First, the Court reserved the right to review the
congressional record regarding the "evil" Congress claimed to
regulate. 50  Second, the Court announced, "'[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end."' 51  Judge Noonan
interprets this test as the Court's implication that it would be the final
arbiter for whether legislation is congruent.52 He argues that both tests
are self-serving because the tests were unnecessary in the decision, and
that they increase the Court's decision-making power at the expense of
the legislature. 53  Implicit in Judge Noonan's writing is the
understanding that these Boerne criteria lay the groundwork for the
Court to challenge other federal statutes.
54
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Flores, 521 U.S. at 507.
44. Id. at 511.
45. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
5.
46. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 35.
47. Flores, 521 U.S. at 519.
48. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 35 (discussing Flores, 521 U.S. at 519-20).
49. Id. at 35-36.
50. Id. at 36.
51. Id. at 35 (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 520).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 39-40.
54. Id. at 40. Judge Noonan refers to the City ofBoerne v. Flores case as Boerne.
2003]
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B. The Rise of State Immunity
Judge Noonan then outlines state immunity; the other doctrinal
device the Court has recently used to protect states from federal
control. Several fictitious characters including "Judge Samuel
Simple," "Boaltman," "Yalewoman," and attorneys from the firm of
"Fish, Frye & Ketchum" engage in a mock discussion on the subject of
state immunity.55  Perhaps Judge Noonan's view that the Court's
present concept of state immunity is largely a fiction, influenced his
decision to discuss the issues through fictional characters. Early in the
debate, "Harvardman" lays out the current law regarding sovereign
immunity:
The law today is that each of the fifty states is a
sovereign, and a sovereign cannot be sued for damages
by an individual, an Indian tribe, or a foreign
government unless the sovereign has consented to being
sued. An unconsenting state, therefore, cannot be sued
in federal court or in state court except by the federal
government itself. It cannot be sued even though
Congress in the exercise of the powers conferred by
Article I (sic) has given individuals the right to sue.56
This serves as the current definition of sovereign immunity.
While Judge Noonan discusses exceptions to this definition of
state immunity,57 this mock discussion brings out two key elements
crucial to his thesis that state immunity is an ill-conceived idea.
58
First, he points out that the concept of the state in state immunity, is
not solely limited to suits by individuals that name a state as a
defendant, but also applies to suits against any governmental entity
having state-wide reach.59  Second, Judge Noonan has the fictitious
55. Id. at 41-85.
56. Id. at 42 (internal citation omitted).
57. Noonan discusses seven exceptions to state immunity. These exceptions are: 1)
habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners; 2) unconstitutional taking by a state official; 3)
claiming a right under a federal law that abrogates state's immunity; 4) reversal of a state's
highest court by the United States Supreme Court; 5) review by the Supreme Court of a case
where a state has consented to be sued only in its own courts; 6) removal of a case from state
court to federal district court; and 7) suit of a state by the United States itself. Id. at 43-50.
Numbers 4 through 7 show situations where a state issue can be "federalized" by review in the
United States Supreme Court.
58. Id. at 50, 52-53.
59. Id. at 50.
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debaters note that the Constitution is silent as to state immunity. He
explains that the Court instead relies on the notion that suits against
states should not be allowed because they hurt the "sovereign dignity"
of the state. 60 This last consideration is not addressed in an objective
fashion. Instead, "Harvardman," "Yalewoman," and "Boaltman" all
make negative observations about the notion that states should be
immune to preserve their dignity and ultimately refer to the Court's
logic as "screwed up." 61 After discussing the two main weapons
employed by the Court in its most recent decisions, the Boerne criteria
and the doctrine of state sovereignty, Judge Noonan turns to various
case studies that apply these devices.
C. The Court Makes States Immune from Legislation Meant to Protect
Individual Rights
The Supreme Court has held that states are immune from
federal legislation that protects certain classes of citizens from abuse
or discrimination. In 2000 the Court held that individuals could not
sue states under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 62
because Congress failed to properly abrogate state immunity. The
ADEA made it illegal to fire or fail to hire someone because of age in
most instances, and tried to abrogate a state's immunity in this area.63
J. Daniel Kimel and other state employed co-plaintiffs sued the Florida
Board of Regents under the ADEA. 64 Kimel, a professor at Florida
State University, alleged that the Board of Regents' failure to budget
for pay increases constituted age discrimination, as all of the plaintiffs
were over forty years old.65 In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the
Court held 5-4 that Florida and its Board of Regents were immune
from being sued under the ADEA.66 The Court applied the standard
put forward in Flores, and held that Congress had not established any
patterns of age discrimination. 6 7 As a result, the legislative response
was disproportionate to the ill they were trying to cure. 68
60. Id. at 52-53 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1998)).
61. Id. at 54-57.
62. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000).
63. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 103, 107.
64. Id. at 105.
65. Id. at 105-06.
66. Id. at 107 (discussing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81-91).
67. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
68. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 107 (discussing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81-91).
2003]
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Judge Noonan first criticizes the decision of the Court on two
main grounds. He argues that while Congress did not establish a
record of age discrimination, as one would do for an appellate court, it
did follow normal legislative processes. 69  U.S. citizens and the
President of the United States identified a national problem with age
discrimination. 0 Congress agreed with the concern and "acted... like
all legislatures act most of the time"71 by passing legislation to correct
this harm.72  Second, Judge Noonan criticizes the Court, whose
members' ages ranged from fifty-one to seventy-nine, for holding that
the elderly are not a "discrete and insular minority" because of the fact
that "[a]t any given time, the majority of persons are not old.",73
D. Unconstitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act Decreases
Federal Ability to Protect Women
The most recent, and perhaps the most striking, case examined
by Judge Noonan is the Court's treatment of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA)7 4 in United States v. Morrison.75 He briefly
describes the VAWA as an attempt by Congress to "remedy a
perceived failure in the states' ordinary administration of criminal
justice., 76 Passed in 1994, the VAWA tried to protect citizens from
gender-motivated violence by creating a civil remedy, which could be
used to seek damages from an alleged attacker.
77
In 1995, Christy Brzonkala, a freshman student at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), sued under
VAWA after she was allegedly raped by Antonio Morrison and James
Crawford, two members of the Virginia Tech football team.78
Criminal rape charges were never brought against Morrison or
Crawford. 9 Judge Noonan describes how Virginia Tech's disciplinary
committee took no action against Crawford for his actions.80 The
school initially gave Morrison a one-year suspension for "using
69. Id. at 109, 111-12.
70. Id. at 109.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 112-13.
74. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2003).
75. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
76. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 120.
77. Id. at 120.
78. Id. at 123.
79. Id. at 121.
80. Id. at 121-22.
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abusive language" after he admitted engaging in sexual relations with
Brzonkala despite her saying no twice. 81 After two rehearings during
which the school denied Brzonkala procedural advantages given to her
attackers, Virginia Tech's Provost annulled Morrison's sentence
completely.
83
Judge Noonan argues that when Brzonkala sued under the
VAWA in December 1995, her case constituted a "textbook case" of
why Congress had created the VAWA.84 Brzonkala was raped on a
state campus, denied procedural rights by her school, she had not filed
criminal charges, and ultimately the school failed to sanction
Brzonkala's assailants. 85 After initially being dismissed at the district
court level without a trial,86 Brzonkala's case was briefly rejuvenated
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 87  However, the court of
appeals sitting en banc again dismissed Brzonkala's claims.88
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and the
Court issued its opinion in United States v. Morrison89 on May 15,
2000. In a 5-4 decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion
of the Court and affirmed the ruling of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 90  First and foremost, the Court turned its attention to
Congress' power to regulate commerce under Article I, § 8 of the
Constitution.91 The majority held that for Congress to regulate an
activity under the Commerce Clause, the activity must be economic in
nature and that gender-motivated crimes failed to meet this
requirement. 92 The Court was concerned that regulation of a "non-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 122. Virginia Tech refused to let Brzonkala have access to audio recordings
and records of the first hearing. Id. At the same, Morrison and his attorney were given full
access to these materials. Id. School officials failed to give Brzonkala notice that Morrison
had appealed a third time, and as a result of that third appeal, Morrison's initial sentence by
Virginia Tech, a two-semester suspension, was annulled. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 123.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 125 (discussing Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F.Supp.
779 (W.D. Va. 1996)).
87. Id. at 126 (discussing Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d
949 (4th Cir. 1997)).
88. Id. (discussing Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
89. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
90. Id. at 599.
91. Id. at 127 (citing The Commerce Clause, which reads "[The Congress shall have the
Power] . . . [t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
92. Id.
20031
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economic" issue through federal legislation would open the floodgates
for Congress to regulate any crime that it found to have a significant
impact on interstate commerce. 93 Specifically, the Court argued that
the entire realm of domestic relations, such as alimony, divorce, and
child custody, had an impact on interstate commerce, and therefore,
could be subject to federal regulation if the VAWA was upheld.94
Moreover, the Court was concerned that the VAWA blurred the lines
between the police powers of the state to regulate common crimes
such as rape and the proper scope of congressional power. 95 The
Court held that Congress could not justify the VAWA under the
Commerce Clause as a commercial activity.
96
Judge Noonan discussed how the Morrison Court applied the
Boerne test, specifically, congruence and proportion between the
injury and the available remedy.97 The Court held that if the evil to be
remedied was the ineffective handling of the situation by state
officials, then the VAWA did not provide a remedy.98 According to
the Court, the sexual assault on Brzonkala was not properly addressed
by the VAWA, and she should seek a remedy under Virginia state
law. 99
Justice Souter's dissent in Morrison, joined by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that the VAWA fell within
Congress' power to regulate commerce. 100 He relied on the large
number of surveys, statistics and studies included in the congressional
record that showed the effect of violence against women on interstate
commerce and the ineffectiveness of state domestic violence statutes
in punishing such offenders.' 0 ' Justice Souter argued that the second
criterion of the Boerne test, congressional establishment of an "evil" to
be regulated, was met by this review of the congressional record.
10 2
In his dissent, Justice Souter also noted its general
dissatisfaction with subjecting the congressional record to review by
the Court to determine if legislation required a review in a given
area. °3 He argued that reviewing evidence used to support legislation
93. Id. at 128.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 129.
96. Id. at 127.
97. See supra p. 5.
98. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 131.
99. Id.
100. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
101. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 131-32.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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is solely within the purview of Congress and not the courts.' °4 Justice
Souter criticized the majority for trying to preserve a "proper sphere of
state autonomy" by overturning the VAWA because there was nothing
in the Constitution stating that the powers of Congress and the states
cannot overlap.' 
05
III. ANALYSIS
Judge Noonan effectively explains how seemingly vague
constitutional principles used by the Court, such as "sovereign
immunity" and the Boerne tests, have a negative effect on individual
rights. 10  His thesis that the present members of the Court are
choosing to protect states over individuals leads him to rather
pessimistic conclusions regarding how this trend can be changed.
0 7
One area not discussed is the treatment of the Supreme Court's
opinions by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where Judge Noonan
sits as a Senior Judge. The Ninth Circuit's response to Morrison v.
United States,1°8 one of the case studies used in Narrowing the
Nation 's Power,'1 9 provides room for optimism that lower courts can
sidestep this case.l°
For a book of only 156 pages, Narrowing The Nation's Power
covers a great deal of material. After laying out the constitutional
principles, Judge Noonan effectively explains how the struggle
between states and the federal government has impacted individuals in
the United States, with the Supreme Court playing the role of referee.
Anyone expecting a treatise on obscure constitutional principles soon
realizes that the effectiveness of important federal legislation such as
the ADEA and VAWA is determined by the current battle, taking
place in the Supreme Court.
Judge Noonan also draws a number of conclusions based upon
his examination of the case studies."' These conclusions take two
main forms." 1 2 First, Judge Noonan discusses possible solutions to the
104. Id. at 132.
105. Id. at 134 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 644 (2000)).
106. See infra pp. 18-21.
107. See infra pp. 20-22.
108. 529 U.S. 598.
109. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 120-37.
110. See infra pp. 22-29.
111. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 140-56.
112. Id.
2003]
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Most of these "solutions," including impeachment, financial cutbacks
by Congress on the Justices' raises, insurance, and parking, as well as
the rejection of future nominees on ideological grounds, are dismissed
outright. 11 4  Judge Noonan briefly discusses a number of realistic
solutions, such as careful crafting of legislation after a review of the
Court's recent decisions, distribution of federal funds based upon
states obeying congressionally mandated conditions, and using other
powers of Congress to try to sidestep the Court's rulings and
accomplish the same ends. 115
Second, Judge Noonan criticizes the Court's decision that in
effect transfers power from the federal government to the states. In
ignoring some key facts of the cases, such as the procedural unfairness
experienced by Christy Brzonkala in Morrison,116 Judge Noonan
argued that the Court exposed that it was not approaching these cases
objectively, but rather with its decision already made.1 17 The notions
of the new requirement that legislation be "congruent" and
"proportionate" are also attacked as an invention and an invasion of
the realm of the legislature.118 Congruence and proportionality are
considered by legislators who "... form their ideas of congruence and
proportion, as most people do, intuitively. They do so because there is
no other guide."' 19 The Court, in second-guessing Congress, brings no
stronger sense of reasoning or logic to these decisions. 20 Instead, the
Justices are inappropriately substituting their value judgments for
those of the members of Congress whose constitutional function it is to
make such decisions.'21
The criticisms and suggestions offered by Judge Noonan paint
a bleak outlook for this area of law. While this assessment may be
largely accurate, there have been some positive developments in the
Ninth Circuit. Considering that Judge Noonan sits on the bench for
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, it is ironic that he did not discuss
the treatment of the Supreme Court's decisions by lower federal
courts, where the bulk of cases are decided. Despite the fact that the
113. Id. at 140-43.
114. Id. at 140-41.
115. Id. at 141-42.
116. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
117. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 144-45.
118. Id. at 145-46.
119. Id. at 146.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 147.
178 [VOL. 3":167
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Supreme Court is funneling power to the states, its decisions are vague
enough that some room exists for an enterprising court of appeals to
maintain a more liberal view. A brief look at the post-Morrison
jurisprudence in Judge Noonan's own Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reveals that Morrison has not had a significant impact on the Ninth
Circuit's decisions. 122 The Ninth Circuit identified holes in Morrison
that could potentially be used by Congress to sidestep its holdings in
attempts to reduce violent crime, both in general and against women.
A. The Impact of "Academic " Constitutional Principles on the
Individual
The importance of Narrowing The Nation 's Power lies in its
ability to expose the Supreme Court's negative impact on the ability of
individuals to seek redress through federal statutes. Judge Noonan
begins his book by providing a quote that represents the Court's theme
in its protection of state sovereignty: "'[T]he States entered the federal
system with their sovereignty intact."",123  Through his insights
regarding the Court's decisions, Judge Noonan translates this
foundational phrase into an issue that can be understood to affect
many.
For example, in reviewing the Court's decision to hold the
public College of Business of the University of Montevallo immune
from the ADEA, Judge Noonan does more than just explain the
holding and dissent. 124 First, he explains that the Court contradicted
itself when it first stated that Congress has "wide latitude" in enforcing
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 125 but later
applied the strict Boerne test 12 6 when reviewing the ADEA. 127 Next,
Judge Noonan argues that despite the Court's assertions to the
contrary, the ADEA addressed a significant societal issue; the forced
retirement of professors from state universities.1 28  This posture is
reflected in the ADEA, that age discrimination by employers, whether
122. See United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cortez,
299 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002).
123. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 2 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S.
775, 779 (1991)).
124. Id. at 109-13 (discussing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)).
125. Id. at 110 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 26 for text of this
amendment).
126. Id. at 35-36.
127. Id.atilO-11.
128. Id. at lll.
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public or private, is a problem. 129  The Court ignored Congress'
decision by exempting the states. Judge Noonan also points out that
by "[b]owing to the stereotype of the elderly [having diminished
mental faculties], the Court unwittingly demonstrated the prevalence
of the stereotype throughout the land."' 130 Noonan argues that if the
learned Justices of the Supreme Court believed that the stereotype of
the elderly as having diminished mental faculties was accurate, then
anyone might believe it. 
131
Judge Noonan's insights help emphasize the fact that the age
discrimination discussed in Kimel is not limited to the facts of the case.
Rather, it is an issue deemed to affect enough people to result in the
passage of legislation addressing the problem. In turn, the Court's
decision limiting the applicability of the ADEA is not only a shift in
power from the federal government to the states, but also a decision
that will make it much harder for elderly public employees to seek
redress in the event of discrimination.'
32
Likewise, when discussing the VAWA, 33 Judge Noonan
effectively highlights that the legislation was aimed at protecting
individuals like Christy Brzonkala, for whom the typical state-
controlled legal remedies of criminal charges or administrative
responses had failed. 134 Additionally, he demonstrates how the debate
over the Commerce Clause, a seemingly vague constitutional
principle, led to the downfall of the VAWA.135 In Morrison,136 the
Court was more concerned with limiting federal power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause. 137 Its desire to limit the applicability of
the Commerce Clause, as utilized by Congress in creating the VAWA,
overrode the Court's concern with the individual wrong suffered by
Christy Brzonkala.1
38
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 112-13.
133. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §13981(b) (2003).
134. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 123-24.
135. Id.
136. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
137. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 137. See supra note 91 for text of the Commerce Clause.
138. Id.
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B. Judge Noonan 's Conclusions: Correct, but Overly Grim
Judge Noonan divides his conclusions into a discussion of
possible responses and criticisms of the Court's recent decisions.'
39
The possible responses are based on his belief that the Court's
newfound notion of sovereign immunity is "[a] doctrine that has
swelled beyond bounds," which gives power to the states and
unjustifiably takes it from the federal government. 140 Judge Noonan's
list of potential "responses" reads more as a checklist of unworkable
options than an attempt to create genuine solutions. For example,
Judge Noonan briefly considers drastic options such as the
impeachment of Justices or reductions of their financial benefits,
including salary raises, parking, and the number of law clerks.
14
'
The focus of the Court on "large questions of constitutional law
and on grand conceptions, such as sovereignty" is also decried by
Judge Noonan. 14 2 Noonan rightly feels that the Court has overlooked
the facts behind the cases before it. 143 For example, in United States v.
Morrison,144 Noonan feels that in reaching its decision, the Court
largely ignored the facts of the assault on Christy Brzonkala and the
insufficient response by Virginia Tech's administrators. 145  Noonan
points out that the decisions reached by the Court in a case such as
Morrison affect all future plaintiffs in a similar situation. 146 Removing
remedies put in place by Congress to protect this exact group of
potential plaintiffs is indefensible. It does damage to these plaintiffs'
rights that is not easily undone by Congress. 1
47
Judge Noonan halfheartedly proposes more useful options to
this problem than the extreme measures he rejects above. 148 Although
buried in his own doubt regarding its effectiveness, one of these
139. Id. at 140-43.
140. Id. at 156.
141. Id. at 140-41.
142. Id. at 144.
143. Id.
144. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
145. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 144-45.
146. Id. at 145.
147. Id. at 145-47. Noonan feels that the Court's decisions to overturn a statute based
upon it being unreasonable (or "incongruous" and "disproportionate") is indefensible when
Congress deemed the statute to be needed based upon research, debate, and anecdotal
evidence. The nine members of the Court should not substitute their hunches for those of
Congress. Id. at 146.
148. Id. at 141.
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options is for the legislature to carefully craft legislation based upon
the restrictive pro-state cases by the Court.
149
When pondering the fate of legislation such as the RFRA,' 50
ADEA,' 5 1 and VAWA, Judge Noonan writes that "[i]t is not certain
that other state employees can be assured the protection of federal anti-
discrimination statutes ... The Violence Against Women Act cannot
be resuscitated unless the Constitution is amended or the members of
the majority change."' 53 It is hard to dispute that what has been done
by the Court cannot be undone without a change in the makeup of the
Supreme Court in the future.
However, perhaps Judge Noonan overestimates what has been
done in theory instead of looking at what has actually been done by
such decisions. In incorporating Supreme Court opinions into their
own, the lower federal courts can still interpret and analyze those
opinions. While the Supreme Court's opinions are mandatory
authority on all federal courts, perhaps Judge Noonan underestimates
the ability of federal courts to find and create loopholes for a mindful
legislature through this process of interpretation.
C. A Glimmer of Hope: Judge Noonan 's Own Ninth Circuit Examines
United States v. Morrison
Judge Noonan, in his haste to criticize the national
developments in the Supreme Court, failed to augment his discussion
through an introspective review of the decisions handed down by his
fellow Ninth Circuit Judges. Perhaps Judge Noonan refrained from
examining such cases because he did not want to draw attention to
more hopeful solutions. Regardless, the treatment of Morrison by the
Ninth Circuit creates room for guarded optimism.
1. United States v. Jones
In November 2000, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v.
Jones.154 The court reviewed whether a federal statute prohibiting a
person subject to a domestic violence restraining order from
possessing a firearm is a violation of the Commerce Clause 155 and the
149. Id.
150. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2003).
151. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 631-634 (2003).
152. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §13981(b) (2003).
153. Id. at 143.
154. 231 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 2000).
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Tenth Amendment. 156  In Jones, Defendant Jones was indicted for
possessing a handgun while subject to a domestic violence protection
order.157 This constituted a violation of a federal statute 158 making it
unlawful for Jones to "possess in or affecting interstate commerce,
any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition;
or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce."1 59 Jones argued that §
922(g)(8) was unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decisions in United States v. Morrison 160 and United States v. Lopez.
16 1
The Ninth Circuit made two distinctions between the statute at
issue in Morrison and the one reviewed in Jones.162 First, the court
held that "the most important distinction is that, unlike § 922(g)(8), the
statute at issue in Morrison does not contain an express jurisdictional
element that demonstrates the necessary nexus between the statutory
provision and interstate commerce."'1 63 The court held that because §
922(g)(8) contained such language, Morrison's restrictive view of the
Commerce Clause did not apply.' 64 Second, the Court held that the
nature of the subject matter regulated by the statutes differed in an
important manner. 165 Whereas the VAWA regulated gender-motivated
violence, which is a non-commercial activity, § 922(g)(8) regulates
possession of firearms that travel in and affect interstate commerce. 166
Both of the differences between Morrison and Jones appear
readily surmountable by Congress. The first difference, identified as
the most important, creates a distinction between a statute explicitly
claiming a link to interstate commerce and one that does not,
regardless of the statute's subject matter. Perhaps adding the words
"interstate commerce" to a statute would legally distinguish it from the
unconstitutional VAWA. 16  The Ninth Circuit also distinguishes §922(g)(8) from another Supreme Court decision, United States v.
156. The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution states: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
157. Jones, 231 F.3d at 511.
158. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2003).
159. Jones, 231 F.3d at 513-14 (quoting § 922(g)(8)).
160. Id. at 514-15 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
161. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See infra pp. 24-25 for a discussion of Lopez.
162. 231 F.3d 508.
163. Id. at 514-15.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (2003).
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Lopez. 168  In Lopez, the Court invalidated another federal firearm
statute, the Gun-Free School Zone Act (GFSZA).169 The Ninth Circuit
noted that the GFSZA did not contain an explicit requirement that
there be a nexus between firearms and interstate commerce.' 7' The
statute at issue in Jones did contain a nexus connecting the prohibited
firearm to interstate commerce.'
71
The second difference between § 922(g)(8) and the VAWA
deals with the subject matter, but again appears easily incorporated by
Congress into future legislation. The purpose of § 922(g)(8) is to
regulate who may possess firearms, not to restrict the passage of
firearms through interstate commerce. Yet, the Ninth Circuit held that
because the statute dealt with firearms that are "manufactured in and
travel through interstate commerce" the statute is a valid regulation of
interstate commerce. 72  Nearly every manufactured object travels
through interstate commerce. Perhaps explicitly connecting a statute
to an item that travels through interstate commerce (for example,
handgun violence against women) would be enough to address this
second consideration.
The Ninth Circuit protected individuals that would make the
legislation more difficult to challenge on constitutional grounds. The
conclusions reached in Narrowing The Nation 's Power provide little
guidance in preserving individual federal remedies in the face of recent
Supreme Court decisions like Morrison.1 73 The result in Jones creates
the possibility that small changes in the wording of a statute may
preserve such remedies.1 74  In Jones, the Ninth Circuit enforced §
922(g)(8) against a state, which suggests that minor adjustments could
be made to federal legislation to protect the legislation from
constitutional challenges. 1
75
168. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
169. United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 514 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)); Gun-Free School Zone Act 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2003)).
170. Id. at 514.
171. Id. See also § 922(g)(8).
172. Jones, 231 F.3d at 514-15 (emphasis added).
173. See 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
174. See 231 F.3d 508.
175. Id.
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2. United States v. Cortez
In United States v. Cortez,176 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether 18 U.S.C.§ 2119177 was constitutional under the Commerce
Clause and in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison.
178
This statute criminalized the taking of a motor vehicle that had been
"transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign
commerce."'' 79 The defendant, Walter Cortez, was convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 2119 for an attempted carjacking and was sentenced to
ninety-seven months in prison.' 80 On the night of the crime, a drunken
Cortez attempted to carjack two individuals at a 7-Eleven by
demanding their car keys.' 81 The second individual was a plainclothes
FBI agent who refused to surrender his keys to Cortez. 182  After a
violent confrontation with the FBI agent, Cortez escaped, only to be
arrested a few hours later.'
83
The facts, as described by the Court of Appeals, do not suggest
that Cortez had any secondary motive for attempting to steal a car,
such as a desire to sell the parts.' 84 Rather, Cortez appears to be an
individual who decided to do something illegal while intoxicated.
185
In holding § 2119 constitutional, the Ninth Circuit
distinguished it from the VAWA at issue in Morrison in two ways.
1 86
First, the Ninth Circuit found that based on the congressional record,
176. 299 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2003). The statute reads:
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm
takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in
interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by
force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall -
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15
years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this
title, including any conduct that, if the conduct occurred in the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
would violate section 2241 or 2242 of this title) results, be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both,
and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for
any number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death.
§ 2119.
178. Cortez, 299 F.3d at 1032 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
179. § 2119.
180. Cortez, 299 F.3d at 1031.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1031-32.
183. Id. at 1032.
184. Id. at 1031-32.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1035.
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the carjacking did affect interstate commerce and could be regulated
under the Commerce Clause. 87 In so holding, the court looked at the
impact of carjacking on interstate commerce.1 88  For example, the
court discussed congressional findings that stolen cars were often
taken to "chop shops" where they were disassembled and their parts
sold in interstate commerce.1 89 The court did not create a requirement
that any federal statute criminalizing carjacking possess a similar
nexus between carjacking and interstate commerce. In fact, the court
held that "[b]ecause we decide that carjacking does substantially affect
interstate commerce, Congress may regulate it in its entirety. That a
particular instance of carjacking may have a de minimis effect on
interstate commerce is of no consequence." 190 Section 2119 contains
no exp ess provisions that require it to eliminate the sale of stolen car
parts. Rather, it criminalizes the act of carjacking under any
circumstance. 192  Presumably, under the Ninth Circuit's holding, a
statute that regulates or criminalizes anything related to carjacking
would be constitutional.
Finally, as in Jones,'93 the court attached significance to the
fact that the nexus between § 2119 and interstate commerce was
contained within the statute.1 94 A motor vehicle stolen as a result of a
carjacking needed to be one that has been "transported, shipped, or
received in interstate or foreign commerce., 195 To this end, the court
noted that the government introduced evidence that the car Cortez
attempted to steal in California was manufactured in Kansas City,
Kansas. 196 Furthermore, the court held that the attempted carjacking in
California of a car manufactured in Kansas "sufficiently tied this
particular carjacking to interstate commerce. No greater nexus
between the carjacking and interstate commerce was required."'1 97
Cortez illuminates a method that could potentially be utilized
by Congress when attempting to tie its legislation to commerce. 198 A
statute with an explicit nexus to interstate commerce may be
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1036.
191. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2003).
192. Id.
193. See discussion supra pp. 22-25.
194. Cortez, 299 F.3d at 1037.
195. Id. at 1036 (quoting § 2119).
196. Id. at 1037.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1036-37.
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constitutional if it regulates an activity deemed to be even remotely
related to interstate commerce. 199 Section 2119 reads as a general
statute criminalizing carjacking under any circumstances, not just
where the intent is to sell the car parts in interstate commerce. As
discussed above, the court went one step further and held that once an
activity is found to impact interstate commerce, "Congress can
regulate in its entirety. 2 °  Perhaps by tying legislation to activities
that impact interstate commerce, in this case carjacking, the legislature
would be able to regulate in areas otherwise out of reach.
As in Jones, the explicit nexus between carjacking and
interstate commerce appears to be a superficial one, accomplished
primarily by placing the words "interstate commerce" within the text
of the statute. The court's application of the statute results in the
conclusion that having a car built in one state and stolen in another is a
sufficient nexus between a crime and interstate commerce. This
conclusion suggests that adding a reference to interstate commerce in a
federal statute may be sufficient to protect the statute from a
constitutional challenge based on the Commerce Clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
Narrowing the Nation 's Power is a brief, yet thorough review
of the Supreme Court's shift of power from the federal government to
the states. It documents the way in which the Court utilized the
sovereign immunity doctrine, increased scrutiny, and the commerce
clause to tie the hands of Congress. 20 1 Judge Noonan shows that these
constitutional principles have considerable impact on federal
legislation such as the VAWA202 and ADEA.2 3 He explains that this
impact on federal statutes affects individuals seeking relief by either
invalidating the statute, or holding the state to be immune from suit.
Noonan concludes conclusion that little can be done to change the
Supreme Court's support of state's rights and sovereign immunity over
the rights of the individual citizen is only partially correct. Although
lower federal courts are bound by Supreme Court decisions, they have
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1036.
201. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 3, 120-37.
202. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(b) (2003).
203. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 631-634 (2003).
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a substantial role in determining how decisions such as Morrison and
Flores are applied in subsequent cases.
For example, United States v. Cortez2°4 and United States v.
Jones 2 5 decided in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on which Judge
Noonan sits, suggest a number of alternatives that Congress could use
to sidestep the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison.2 06 The Ninth
Circuit cases suggest that a statute with one or more of the following
qualities may survive a constitutional challenge based upon Morrison:
1) an explicit nexus between a statutory provision and interstate
commerce; 2) connection of the subject of the new statute to an object
that has traveled through interstate commerce; or 3) an activity that is
connected to interstate commerce. These measures do not provide a
guarantee that a statute will survive constitutional review, but they do
provide some measure of hope that decisions such as Morrison,2 0 7 and
other cases reviewed by Judge Noonan, have not created an
insurmountable barrier in the name of state sovereignty against federal
protection of the individual.
204. 299 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002).
205. 231 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 2000).
206. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
207. 1d.
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